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I. INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom has played a pivotal role in the history and cul-
tural development of the United States.' Religion historically has been
considered a fundamental aspect of American culture, resulting in the
granting of numerous legal rights and privileges to religious personnel
and institutions.2 These grants stem from the protections in the Bill of
Rights and include privileges that, though of undoubted importance,
1. See generally S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1968); D. KELLEY, WHY
CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES (1977); B. SCHwARTz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (1971).
2. See D. KELLEY, supra note 1, at 47-48, 58.
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are not known widely and may fail to provoke controversy to the same
extent as perceived infringements or endorsements of religion.'
Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code grants one of the lesser-
known privileges.4 This statute permits a "minister of the gospel" to
exclude from gross income either the rental value of a furnished home
or rental allowance paid to the minister as compensation to the extent
that it actually is used to provide a home.5 Section 107, also known as
the parsonage allowance exclusion, historically has created little contro-
versy," probably because it has had relatively little impact on tax reve-
nues 7 and is known primarily to its beneficiaries. In recent years,
however, individuals who see its potential as a tax-avoiding device have
paid increased attention to the exclusion. The government, seeking to
preserve an ever, shrinking tax base, has taken strides to narrow the
scope of the statute or eliminate it altogether. Given the Supreme
Court's recent church-state decisions, section 107 seems destined to re-
ceive even greater attention in the coming decade.
This Note analyzes the current section 107-determining its roots,
discussing its application and effect, and expressing concern about its
future vitality. Part II examines the history of the statute. Part III ana-
lyzes current interpretation of the section to determine the criteria that
guide the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts in their appli-
cation of the statute. Part IV discusses events of the last decade includ-
ing publicized abuses by mail-order ministries, as well as IRS and
judicial decisions, that suggest future changes in the statute's interpre-
tation and application. Part IV also discusses various governmental ef-
forts either to eliminate or to amend the reach of section 107. Finally,
Part V examines the constitutionality of section 107 in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions. Focusing on the major shift in establishment
3. The application of Social Security to ministers provides a good example. Until 1955, min-
isters were excluded from the Social Security program absolutely; from 1955 until 1968, they could
be covered only if they opted into the program. Tax Planning for the Clergy, Tax Ideas (P-H)
11,018 (Dec. 7, 1988). Ministers currently may opt out of Social Security coverage by filing the
appropriate forms. Id.
4. I.R.C. § 107 (1990) states:
In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not include-
(1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his compensation; or
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the extent used by
him to rent or provide a home.
5. Id.
6. A LEXIS search conducted by the Author yielded no cases concerning application of or
challenge to the statute from the year of its passage until its revision in 1954. Additionally, no
debate or discussion in Congress occurred during this period.
7. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 101ST CONG., 1ST SEss., DATA AND MATERIALS FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR 1990 FINANCE CoMM. REPORT UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT 16, 138
(Comm. Print 1989) (showing that the parsonage allowance exclusion resulted in a revenue loss of
$195 million, or .01963% of the total projected budget outlay of $993 billion, for fiscal year 1990).
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clause analysis evident in Supreme Court decisions since 1983, Part V
first considers whether the exclusion passes constitutional muster under
the Court's old and new tests. Next, this Note specifically examines two
recent Supreme Court tax exemption cases and suggests that section
107 fails to meet the enunciated first amendment standards. Finally,
this Note concludes that section 107 in its present form faces an uncer-
tain future and suggests that Congress should scrutinize the parsonage
allowance exclusion and any other tax relief for ministers to the same
degree as benefits enjoyed by any other taxpayer class.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT STATUTE
Congress first excluded the rental value of parsonages from gross
income in the Revenue Act of 1921.1 Section 213(b)(11) of the 1921 Act
provided simply that a minister of the gospel could exclude from gross
income the rental value of any "dwelling house and appurtenances
thereof" (in sum referred to as a "parsonage") provided by a church as
part of a compensation package." Passage of the statute generated no
discernible controversy, either in Congress or the courts.10 The lack of
controversy seems understandable given existing tax treatment of
churches,"1 as well as the general respect held by Congress and the pub-
lic for churches.1 2
The statute remained substantially unchanged until 1954 when
Congress revised the Internal Revenue Code. 3 Congress made two sig-
nificant changes to the exclusion: first, it replaced the phrase "dwelling
house and appurtenances thereof' with the word "home," effectively
broadening the application of the statute thereby to include apartment.
dwellers.' 4 Second, and more importantly, Congress added a new provi-
sion that permitted the exclusion from income of a cash rental or hous-
ing allowance.' 5 This change permitted a minister to designate a specific
8. 42 Stat. 239 (1921) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 107 (1990)).
9. Id.
10. See supra note 6.
11. See D. KELLEY, supra note 1, at 11-12 (discussing the policy underlying the Revenue Act
of 1913 not to tax nonprofit corporations, including churches); see also Bittker & Rahdert, The
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 289, 357-58
(1976) (stating that the exemption of nonprofit organizations "reflects the application of estab-
lished principles of income taxation to organizations which, unlike the typical business organiza-
tion, do not seek profit").
12. For a historical sketch of the growth of religious privileges in western society, leading to
tax exemption in twentieth century America, see M. LARSON & C. LOWELL, THE RELIGIOUS EMPIRE
10-18 (1976).
13. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
(68A Stat.) 1.
14. See I.R.C. § 107; see also 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4017, 4171, 4820.
15. See I.R.C. § 107(2). See generally H.R. REP. No. 4275, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
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portion of compensation as a housing allowance and exclude this
amount from income to the extent it actually was used to provide a
home.'8 Congress, by this expansion, intended to extend favorable tax
treatment to ministers who bought or rented because their churches
could not provide homes.' Since its 1954 amendment, Congress has
made no additional changes to the statute.
In many respects section 107 resembles the better-known and-more
general section 119, which allows exclusion of the value of meals and
lodging that are provided on the business premises of an employer as a
convenience to the employer and a condition of employment. 8 Com-
mentators have noted the similarity in purpose and effect, and some
have questioned why a separate exclusion for ministerial housing is
needed under the Code.' This question is difficult; pinpointing an ex-
act reason for the separate exclusion is not easy because of the absence
of legislative history or other traditional sources of legislative intent.2
Some commentators have suggested that Congress created the exclusion
because ministers might fail to qualify under the section 119 criteria;
section 107, on the other hand, guarantees a tax benefit to ministers as
a favored class.2' Although this conclusion is plausible, especially given
Congress's tendency to benefit favored entities,22 the available legisla-
tive history does not offer strong support.23 The commonly encountered
1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4017, 4171.
16. See Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(c) (as amended in 1963).
17. Representative Peter Mack, author of the bill that expanded § 107, stated:
Certainly, in these times when we are being threatened by a godless and antireligious
world movement we should correct this discrimination against certain ministers of the gospel
who are carrying on such a courageous fight against this foe. Certainly this is not too much to
do for these people who are caring for our spiritual welfare.
Hearings on General Revenue Revisions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1576 (1953); see also R. HAmmAR, PASTOR, CHURCH AND LAW 100 (1983).
18. Internal Revenue Code § 119(a) states, in part:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals or lodging
furnished to him, his spouse, or any of his dependents by or on behalf of his employer for the
convenience of the employer, but only if-
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises of the em-
ployer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such lodging on the business
premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.
I.R.C. § 119(a) (1990).
19. See, e.g., M. LARSON & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 21-23.
20. See Internal Revenue Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 497-577 (1921); S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st. Sess.
(1921); H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
21. See, e.g., Comment, Tax Benefits for the Clergy: The Unconstitutionality of Section 107,
62 GEo. L.J. 1261, 1272 (1974).
22. See B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-ExEmpt ORGANIZATIONS 3-18 (5th ed. 1987) (describing
various tax-exempt entities and exploring various rationales for their favored treatment).
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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difficulty of determining whether a minister is an employee of a church
or is self-employed also might explain the rationale for the separate
provision. Because the IRS historically has characterized ministers as
self-employed for tax purposes,25 section 119's lodging value exclusion
would be unavailable to many who currently benefit under section 107.
Beyond its potential for denying certain ministers favorable treat-
ment, from the perspective of ministers, section 119 differs from section
107 in three other key respects: it allows an exclusion only for housing,
a cash housing allowance is not exempt; it has stricter criteria for quali-
fication than section 107;16 and, unlike section 107, section 119
presumes that the value of any employer-provided housing is includible
in gross income, thereby shifting to the minister the burden of proving
necessity and convenience to the employing church. 27 In most circum-
stances, ministers who live near or on the church premises in church-
owned homes would qualify for exclusion under section 119. Ministers
who buy or rent homes, however, would lose their currently favorable
treatment if forced to rely on section 119.
III. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE
A. Minister of the Gospel: Eligibility
Income tax regulations require that any home or housing allowance
excluded from income under section 107 must constitute remuneration
for ordinary ministerial services.28 Judicial decisions and IRS rulings29
indicate that a qualifying minister must meet three general tests: (1)
function (does this person do what a minister of this particular faith
ordinarily does?),30 (2) authority (is this person officially commissioned
24. See generally R. HAMMAR, supra note 17, at 21-28.
25. Id. at 23.
26. For the value of lodging to be deductible, the employer must require the employee to
accept the lodging to perform employment duties properly. This requirement contemplates job
situations in which the employee either must be constantly available to the employer or would be
unable to perform the job without the lodging. Tress. Reg. § 1.119-1(b) (1985). In addition, regula-
tions specifically disallow the deduction of additional compensation in lieu of lodging. Id. § 1.119-
1(e).
27. See Caratan v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1971).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963).
29. Courts and the IRS historically have defined the phrase "minister of the gospel" without
much help from Congress. Congressional documents have referred to the phrase only once since it
first appeared in 1921. During hearings on the Revenue Act of 1934, the Senate Finance Commit-
tee discussed changing the words "the gospel" to "religion," but took no action. See Confidential
Hearings of the Senate Comm. on Finance on the Revenue Act of 1934, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31
(1934).
30. See Tress. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963); see also Rev. Rul. 78-301, 1978-2 C.B.
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or "set forth" as a minister?), 31 and (3) base of ministry (is this person
recognized as a minister by or affiliated with an identifiable religious
body?).,s
Examples of specific services that meet the functional test are (1)
performing sacerdotal functions, (2) conducting religious worship, (3)
administrating and maintaining religious 6rganizations and their inte-
gral agencies,33 and (4) performing administrative and teaching duties
at theological seminaries.3 4 The first two categories of services qualify
for the exemption whether or not they, are performed for a religious
organization or one of its agencies.3 5 By comparison, teaching and ad-
ministrative services qualify only when the minister renders the services
for an integral agency of a church or denomination."'
To pass the authority test, a minister must be duly ordained, com-
missioned, or licensed by a legitimate church or denomination.3 7 If a
church ordains some ministers, and licenses or commissions others, it
must recognize the minister as having the status and authority of full
ordination and as being qualified to exercise substantially all ecclesias-
tical duties commensurate with ordination s.3  The base of ministry test
31. See, e.g., Kirk v. Commissioner, 425 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Rev. Rul. 59-270, 1959-2
C.B. 44.
32. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2) (1968).
33. The IRS will consider, in determining if an institution is an integral agency of the church
or denomination, whether (1) the church (or religious organization) incorporated the institution,
(2) a church relationship is indicated in the agency name, (3) the church actually controls the
institution, (4) the church approves trustees or directors of the institution, (5) the church may
remove the trustees or directors, (6) the church requires annual reports of finances or operations,
(7) the church provides support to the institution, and (8) the agency would turn over assets of the
institution to the church upon dissolution of the institution. Rev. Rul. 72-606, 1972-2 C.B. 78.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963); see also Tress. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-(5)(b)(2)
(1968).
35. Tress. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-(5)(b)(2)(iii) (1968); Tress. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in
1963).
36. See Rev. Rul. 72-606, 1972-2 C.B. 78; Rev. Rul. 68-68, 1968-1 C.B. 51; Rev. Rul. 63-90,
1963-1 C.B. 27.
37. Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor regulations define "church." For administrative
purposes, however, the IRS has formulated certain criteria, at least some of which an organization
must meet to be considered a church for tax purposes. These criteria are (1) a distinct legal exist-
ence, (2) a recognized creed and form of worship, (3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical govern-
ment, (4) a formal code of doctrine or discipline, (5) a distinct religious history, (6) a membership
not associated with any other church or denomination, (7) a complete organization of ordained
ministers that serve the church's congregations and have completed prescribed courses of study,
(8) a literature of its own, (9) established places of worship, (10) regular congregations, (11) regular
religious services, (12) schools for the religious instruction of the young, (13) schools for the prepa-
ration of its ministers, and broadly, (14) any other facts or circumstances that may bear upon the
organization's claim to church status. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW
OF TAX RULES APPLICABLE TO ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED IN TELEVISION MINISTRIES 2
(Comm. Print 1987). As defined by these criteria, "church" potentially includes synagogues, tem-
ples, and similar religious groupings. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 22, at 198-206.
38. Rev. Rul. 65-124, 1965-1 C.B. 60; see also Rev. Rul. 78-301, 1978-2 C.B. 103.
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requires the minister to be under the authority of an identifiable
church, a denomination, or an association of churches. 9 If a minister
performs services under assignment by such a church or governing
body, the minister can qualify for the section 107 exclusion even if the
services do not involve religious worship or sacerdotal functions and are
not performed for an integral agency 0 of the church.
Originally, individuals who performed ministerial duties for non-
Christian faiths were excluded from the benefits of section 107. Al-
though the IRS always has considered rabbis to be ministers of the gos-
pel for purposes of the tax benefit,41 the IRS originally denied the
benefit to nonordained Jewish cantors on the theory that their duties
were not substantially equivalent to those of rabbis.42 Eventually, how-
ever, the United States Tax Court held that persons in other religions
holding a status equivalent to those already benefitting from the exclu-
sion also were entitled to the exclusion.43 Subsequently, the IRS has
accorded clerical personnel from non-Christian faiths minister-of-the-
gospel status for section 107 purposes. The current IRS test focuses on
whether the minister performs services that, according to the tenets and
practices of a given faith, relate to conducting religious worship or to
performing sacerdotal functions.44
As a rule, nonordained staff ministers, such as for music or educa-
tion, do not qualify for the parsonage allowance exclusion; 45 it is un-
clear, however, whether such ministers would qualify if ordained or
commissioned, because ordination raises a presumption that one is ful-
filling the ordinary duties of a minister of the gospel. 46 Even if or-
dained, however, an itinerant evangelist or preacher who ministers to
numerous independent congregations may have difficulty passing IRS
scrutiny because an itinerant minister is not affiliated directly. with a
particular congregation.47 The IRS and the courts, however, have not
39. See Tress. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(i) (1968).
40. Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(v).
41. See Rev. Rul. 58-221, 1958-1 C.B. 53.
42. See Rev. Rul. 61-213, 1961-2 C.B. 27 (denying exclusion to nonordained Jewish cantor
who performed duties at community center on a part-time basis); cf. Rev. Rul. 58-221, 1958-1 C.B.
53 (granting exclusion to cantor whose duties were substantially equivalent to those of rabbi and
who the governing body had ordained).
43. Silverman v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 727 (1972), aff'd in an unreported decision, No. 72-
1336 (8th Cir. July 11, 1973); see also Salkov v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 190, 192 (1966).
44. See generally Rev. Rul. 78-301, 1978-2 C.B. 103 (revoking Rev. Rul. 61-213, 1961-2 C.B.
27); Tax Planning for the Clergy, supra note 3, 1 11,018.1.
45. See Kirk v. Commissioner, 425 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Dressler v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 210 (1971); Lawrence v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 494 (1968); Rev. Rul. 65-124, 1965-1 C.B. 60,
modified by Rev. Rul. 78-301, 1978-2 C.B. 103; Rev. Rul. 59-270, 1959-2 C.B. 44.
46. See Tress. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5 (1968).
47. See, e.g., Warnke v. United States, No. 85-61 (E.D. Ky. July 17, 1986) (denying exclusion
1991]
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necessarily disqualified self-styled or self-appointed ministers who lack
a formal affiliation with an established religion.48
Ministers serving in nonparish roles historically have encountered
some difficulty in qualifying for the parsonage exclusion. Administrative
ministers 49-those who do not serve a parish, but who oversee religious
organizations or parachurch ministries-have received mixed treat-
ment. Administrative ministers who serve within an established church
hierarchy qualify,50 as do most ministers who head parochial schools.5 '
Those who manage nursing homes5 2 or work for charitable corporations
not affiliated with a church,53 however, usually have failed the func-
tional test applied by the IRS. While certain ministers who teach at
seminaries have qualified for the exclusion,54 college professors, even
those teaching religion at church-affiliated universities, usually have
not.5 A retired minister may exclude a housing allowance under section
107, but only if (1) the minister is a member of a retirement plan oper-
ated by a church, a national church organization, or an agency of such
an organization; (2) the organization designates the allowance in ad-
vance of payment; (3) the allowance applies only to income received
under the retirement plan; and (4) income from the plan compensates
the minister for past ministerial services. 6
B. Home
Any amount excluded under sectioi 107 must represent the actual
value of a provided home or, in the case of a cash allowance, the actual
cost of maintaining a home.5 7 The regulations define "home" as a dwell-
ing place, furnishings, and appurtenances.58 A travelling minister may
to a traveling evangelist).
48. See Note, A Constitutional Challenge to Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code, 57
NOTRE DAME LAW. 853, 859 (1982).
49. This title is derived from IRS regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(iv), (v)
(1968).
50. See Rev. Rul. 66-90, 1966-1 C.B. 27.
51. See Rev. Rul. 62-171, 1962-2 C.B. 39. But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-46-018 (Aug. 14, 1986)
(stating that the minister serving as administrator for a school incorporated as an ecclesiastical
corporation did not qualify for exclusion under section 107).
52. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-25-047 (Mar. 24, 1987).
53. See Rev. Rul. 78-172, 1978-1 C.B. 35. But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-19-004 (Jan. 28, 1985).
54. Compare Rev. Rul. 70-549, 1970-2 C.B. 16 (granting the exclusion to ministers who work
for church-supported seminaries) with Rev. Rul. 63-90, 1963-1 C.B. 27 (disallowing the exclusion
for ministers who work for seminaries not under the authority of churches or denominations).
55. See Flowers v. United States, No. CA-4-79-376-E (N.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 1981) (text in
WESTLAW); cf. Rev. Rul. 70-549, 1970-2 C.B. 16 (allowing the exclusion where the church con-
trolled the university as an integral agency).
56. Rev. Rul. 75-22, 1975-1 C.B. 49.
57. R. HAMMAR, supra note 17, at 104-05.
58. Tress. Reg. § 1.107-1(b) (as amended in 1963).
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exclude the cost of maintaining a home, but not travelling or lodging
expenses. 59 Additionally, the minister must receive the home or allow-
ance from a legitimate religious organization; the IRS strictly disallows
any exclusion in cases in which the housing allowance actually repre-
sents the return of so-called "contributions" that the minister previ-
ously made to the compensating body. 0 This posture is consistent with
the IRS's tough private inurement requirements regarding charitable
contributions. 1
C. Amount of Exclusion
1. Parsonage Provided by Church
If a minister has free use of a parsonage, the amount excludible
from gross income is limited to the fair rental value of the home, in-
cluding appurtenances and furnishings, as well as the cost of utilities.62
The church need not designate the rental value of the parsonage, as is
required with a housing allowance, but regulations do require the
church to designate any allowance for utilities.63 The purpose of the fair
rental value limit, according to the IRS, is to avoid discrimination
against ministers who must pay market value when renting homes. 4
The IRS provides no precise method for computing fair rental value.6
2. Housing Allowance
The minister who receives a monetary housing allowance must
meet stricter requirements to qualify for the section 107 exclusion.
First, the minister must ensure that the employing church or organiza-
tion officially designates the allowance amount in advance of payment;
otherwise, the IRS will deny the exclusion.66 Timing the designation
can be critical; while the employer need not make the designation in
59. Rev. Rul. 64-326, 1964-2 C.B. 37.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Jiggetts, 850 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming conviction of
mail-order minister who used church account to pay personal expenses).
61. A contribution qualifies as charitable under the Internal Revenue Code only if no part of
the contribution "inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." I.R.C. §
170(c)(2)(C) (1990). For cases that have interpreted this statute in the ministry context, see Ran-
dolph v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 339 (1987), and cases cited therein; Page v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1351 (1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987); McGahen v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 468 (1981).
62. See Rev. Rul. 71-280, 1971-2 C.B. 92.
63. See Rev. Rul. 59-350, 1959-2 C.B. 45.
64. See R HAMMAR, supra note 17, at 106.
65. One commentator has suggested a monthly valuation figure of 1% of the market value of
the home. See Tax Planning for the Clergy, supra note 3, 11,018.1(4).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(b) (as amended in 1963); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-11-075 (Dec. 19,
1984) (denying exclusion when church made retroactive designation).
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advance of the taxable or calendar year, the employer must designate
the allowance before paying it to the minister.6 The minister will lose
the exclusion if the employer fails to designate the allowance in advance
because the IRS disallows retroactive designations.6 8 A designation dur-
ing the taxable year, however, will preserve the exclusion of any subse-
quent payments made to the minister.6 9 Additionally, the providing
organization generally must designate the amount of the allowance in
writing70 and list all allowances in appropriate organizational records
such as the recipient's employment contract, minutes, or a resolution.7 1
An adequate designation will distinguish the housing allowance from
salary or other remuneration and will state the allowance in terms of a
percentage of gross income or a specific dollar amount.72 A church may
not designate as housing allowance an amount in excess of fair market
value." This limit prevents an employer from designating the minister's
entire salary as a tax-free housing allowance. In addition, the desig-
nated allowance may not exceed reasonable compensation for the minis-
ter's services to the church; this provision holds special importance for
part-time ministers.74
Proper designation by the church does not guarantee the minister
full exclusion of the housing allowance. Regulations forbid the exclusion
from income of any amount of the designated allowance that the minis-
ter does not use "to rent or otherwise provide a home." 5 The IRS has
given this requirement a fairly broad interpretation. 6 The minister may
exclude every household expense, except food, personal servants, and
automobiles, under the IRS interpretation. 7 The minister, however,
67. R. HAMMAR, supra note 17, at 103.
68. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-11-075 (Dec. 19, 1984).
69. R. HAMMAR, supra note 17, at 103.
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(b) (as amended in 1963). But see Libman v. Commissioner, 44
T.C.M. (CCH) 370 (1982) (allowing the exclusion, even though not made in writing, because oral
designation clearly was established).
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(b) (as amended in 1963).
72. R. HAMMAR, supra note 17, at 103.
73. See Marine v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 609 (1967) (including cost of utilities); Rev. Rul. 71-
280, 1971-2 C.B. 92.
74. See Rev. Rul. 78-448, 1978-2 C.B. 105.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(c) (as amended in 1963).
76. M. LARsoN & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 22. Larson and Lowell state:
In fact, every expense, except food and personal servants, may be covered by the excludable
check handed by the congregation to the minister. In practice, of course, the IRS has no
means of judging whether the expense payment is reasonable [because such payments are]
not reportable either by the church or the recipient.. . . And so while the waitress who sits in
the pew is required to report every dime she receives in tips [under I.R.C. § 6053] on pain of
severest penalties, the good reverend preaching the gospel to her may enjoy a $30,000 or
$40,000 salary without owing a penny of income taxes.
Id.
77. R. HAMMAR, supra note 17, at 105; see Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1 (as amended in 1963).
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cannot exclude any amount beyond actual expenses and must docu-
ment each expense thoroughly. 78 The minister must include as gross in-
come any portion of the allowance not used for actual housing
expenses.79
The minister also must adhere to specific reporting requirements to
preserve the exclusion. 0 Ministers exclude the parsonage allowance
simply by not reporting it on their tax returns; this means that a church
which issues the minister a W-2 form must not report any portion of
the excluded allowance.8' If a minister is treated as self-employed for
tax purposes, the church also should reduce the compensation reported
on its Form 1099 by the amount of the designated allowance.2
IV. RECENT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
Until recently, the parsonage allowance exclusion received great
favor and little scrutiny. Events of the past decade, however, have
changed this. Scandals involving certain television minis-
triesas-undoubtedly the most notorious beneficiaries of the exclu-
78. This documentation prepares the minister for IRS audits. Tax Planning for the Clergy,
supra note 3, 5 11,018.1(6).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(c) (as amended in 1963).
80. R. HAMMAR, supra note 17, at 108.
81. Id.
82. Id. Form 1099 is an information return that an entity must file with the IRS whenever it
pays compensation of $600 or more to a nonemployee, or interest income of $10 or more to any
individual in a given year. Id. at 154; see I.R.C. §§ 6041, 6049 (1990). Depending on the payment
type, the form will carry a different suffix. Compensation to nonemployees is reported on Form
1099-NEC; interest income is reported on Form 1099-INT. R. HAMMAR, supra note 17, at 154.
Ministers who qualify as church employees must be issued a W-2 form. Id.
83. One of the more notorious scandals involved evangelist Jim Bakker. Bakker founded
PTL (standing for "Praise The Lord" or "People That Love") in 1974 in Charlotte, North Caro-
lina. See Ostling, Of God and Greed: Bakker and Falwell Trade Charges in Televangelism's Un-
holy Row, TIME, June 8, 1987, at 70 [hereinafter Ostling, God and Greed]. PTL's 1986 revenues
were estimated to be $192 million. Neuhaus, At the Helm of PTL: For the Rev. Jerry Falwell, the
Day of Reckoning Dawns Bright, PEOPLE, June 15, 1987, at 30.
Early in 1987, Bakker confessed to having had sex in 1980 with church secretary Jessica Hahn
in a Florida hotel. Reports soon followed that between 1980 and 1987, Bakker, through PTL, gave
Hahn some $265,000 in "hush money" to keep the liaison a secret. This revelation crippled Bak-
ker's sizeable ministry-an enterprise that included a syndicated daily Christian talk show, a mul-
timillion dollar amusement park, and a cable television network. See Ostling, TV's Unholy Row: A
Sex-and-Money Scandal Tarnishes Electronic Evangelism, Tnsm, Apr. 6, 1987, at 61 [hereinafter
Ostling, Unholy Row].
As the ministry scrambled to survive the fallout from Bakker's confession, television and print
media publicized the opulent lifestyle enjoyed by Bakker and his wife, and uncovered evidence
that Bakker had misused or squandered ministry funds. One notable example supposedly included
money raised to build an addition to the Grand Hotel at Heritage USA, PTL's amusement park.
Reportedly, Bakker raised $50 million for the structure, "but only $11 million was allotted to con-
struction." Ostling, God and Greed, supra, at 72. The Bakkers received $4.8 million in salaries and
bonuses from 1984 to 1987, and lived in a private penthouse in the Grand Hotel. Id. In addition,
the Bakkers reportedly owned a condominium in Florida worth $440,000, Wadler, Breaking Faith,
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sion-prompted Congress and the media to scrutinize the finances of
several televangelists. 84 In addition, because of pressures to reduce the
deficit and fears of tax base erosion, the government began to police tax
statutes more carefully during the 1980s. The increased attention un-
covered numerous abuses of the exclusion and prompted efforts to re-
strict its application or even eliminate it entirely. This section
chronicles some of the more significant challenges that faced the par-
sonage allowance exclusion during the past decade and discusses the
immediate and ultimate impact of these challenges.
A. Mail-Order Ministry Abuses5
The IRS began to scrutinize "mail-order ministries" in 1978 during
a service crackdown on illegal tax protester schemes 86 Generally a mail-
order ministry is a plan in which a promoter, in the name of a church,
sells certificates of ordination or licensure through the mail in exchange
for donations.8 7 Recipients of these credentials then become "minis-
ters," establish their own "churches" or religious foundations, and oper-
ate the entities as tax-exempt organizations.8" By funnelling income
Two TV Idols Fall: They Preached to Millions, but Their Sins Brought Jim and Tammy Bakker
to Ruin, PEOPLE, May 18, 1987, at 81, and a California home worth $650,000. Jim, Tammy Bakker
Reportedly Shopping for Home in Newport, L.A. Times, Nov. 11, 1987, pt. 2, at 3, col. 1 (Orange
County ed.). Outraged viewers deserted PTL and donations plummeted. Reports of Bakker's
seven-figure salary and the ministry's millions of dollars in tax-free income prompted Congress to
investigate the financial dealings of television ministries. See TV Preachers' Testimonial on Hill:
To Right the Wrong of PTL, BROADCASTING, Oct. 12, 1987, at 73. The scandal forced PTL into
bankruptcy, see In re Heritage Village Church and Missionary Fellowship, Inc., 92 Bankr. 1000
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1988) (approving final plan), and resulted in Bakker's conviction for 24 counts of
fraud and conspiracy. See Sanders, The Wrath of "Maximum Bob": Jim Bakker's Stiff Punish-
ment Raises Questions over Sentencing, TIME, Nov. 6, 1989, at 62.
Although Bakker excluded from income at least two valuable homes under § 107, the exclu-
sions were never an issue at Bakker's trial or PTL's bankruptcy disposition. The PTL affair, how-
ever, did serve to expose § 107's existence and demonstrate its potential for abuse to a large,
previously uneducated, segment of the public. For more information on the PTL scandal, see
Brand, An "Outrageous" Ministry: Jim Bakker Accused of Financial and Sexual Misdeeds, TIME,
May 4, 1987, at 82; Ostling, God and Greed, supra, at 70-71; Ostling, Unholy Row, supra, at 60.
84. Interestingly, Jimmy Swaggart is the only television minister that became involved in a
reported § 107 case during the 1980s. See Swaggart v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 759 (1984)
(denying exclusion for allowance not actually spent to provide a home to Swaggart).
85. For two excellent full-length treatments of the mail-order ministry problem, see Casino,
"I Know It When I See It": Mail-Order Ministry Tax Fraud and the Problem of a Constitution-
ally Acceptable Definition of Religion, 25 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 113 (1987) and Scialabba, Kurtxman
& Steinhart, Mail-Order Ministries Under the Section 107 Charitable Contribution Deduction:
The First Amendment Restrictions and the Minister's Burden of Proof, and the Effect of TRA
'86, 11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1988).
86. For an explanation of the IRS crackdown, see ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTERS THREATEN TAX
SYSTEM, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S. (1981).
87. Gen. Counsf. Mem. 37,247 (1977).
88. See Casino, supra note 85, at 113.
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through the newly created church, the minister can avoid paying sub-
stantial amounts of income tax.
The mail-order minister usually contributes large amounts of
money to the church organization, itemizing and deducting these con-
tributions from adjusted gross income under Internal Revenue Code
section 170.89 The church then pays the minister's living expenses as a
part of its operation and may provide the minister a housing allowance
that the minister then excludes under section 107.90 Through this ar-
rangement mail-order ministers evade paying taxes on a large portion of
their taxable income.
Courts, predictably, have been hostile to mail-order ministries.
Since the IRS escalated efforts to prosecute mail-order ministries as
tax-protest "schemes," '91 courts uniformly have denied these organiza-
tions tax-exempt status.92 Numerous mal-order ministers have been
convicted for tax fraud, including taking fraudulent deductions under
section 107.93
Despite the effectiveness of the recent crackdown on mail-order
ministries, the IRS has not scrutinized traditional churches, apparently
because these groups satisfy the current criteria for legitimacy. 4 At
least one commentator has questioned the validity and consistent appli-
cation of these criteria, however, and has concluded that the IRS treats
large, powerful churches favorably while small, obscure, or doctrinally
89. An individual may deduct amounts that do not exceed 50% of the taxpayer's "contribu-
tion base," an amount that equals adjusted gross income as computed without regard to any net
operating loss carryback to the taxable year under I.R.C. § 172. I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A), (F) (1990).
90. Courts in mail-order ministry cases have required evidence that claimed parsonage al-
lowances are "reasonable," a word that does not appear in § 107. See, e.g., Holloway v. United
States, Civil No. S-88-0156-MLS-EM (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Van Cleve v. United States, No. C-85-1053 SC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1986) (text in WESTLAW).
91. See Casino, supra note 85, at 121-23. Bruce Casino uses the word "scheme" repeatedly to
describe mail-order ministries. See id. at 114, 121-22.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 799 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that "the efforts
of this defendant to avoid accurate reporting and payment of federal income tax was to create a
sham"); Brown v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1321, 1322 (1986) (referring to one especially
prolific mail-order ministry, the Universal Life Church, as the "center of ... highly abusive tax
scams").
93. See, e.g., United States v. Day, No. 87-1288 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1988) (text in WESTLAW)
(affirming conviction under I.R.C. § 7201 for willful evasion of tax through filing of fraudulent tax
returns); United States v. Jiggetts, Nos. 87-5075(L), 87-5076, 87-5133 (4th Cir. June 16, 1988) (text
in WESTLAW) (affirming convictions for conspiracy to defraud the government under 18 U.S.C. §
371, and for tax evasion).
94. In criticizing these criteria, listed supra note 37, Bruce Casino has stated, "In general, the
criteria tend to apply to large, formal, well-established churches but not to smaller and less tradi-
tional or established denominations. Indeed, because they discriminate between religious organiza-
tions, they probably violate the first amendment." Casino, supra note 85, at 140. Casino proposes a
two-pronged test for determining whether an organization is a religion: (1) possession of a "sin-
cerely held belief in a sacred or transcendent reality," and (2) organization with the purpose and
practice of expressing that belief. Id. at 139.
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unique churches face disproportionate examination for tax violations. 5
Given the Supreme Court's new approach to taxation of religious or-
ganizations,9 s however, all churches and ministers probably will face in-
creased scrutiny in the future.
B. The Treasury's Attempt to Eliminate Section 107
In fulfillment of campaign promises to make federal taxation fairer
and simpler, President Ronald Reagan in 1984 began his campaign for a
complete overhaul of the tax system.17 To determine what areas the ad-
ministration changes should target, the President asked the Treasury
Department to devise a tax reform plan; this plan would serve as a basis
for Congress's revision of the Internal Revenue Code.98 After several
months, the Treasury unveiled its report to the President.99 Among its
many recommendations for change was a proposal to eliminate the par-
sonage exclusion.100
Constituents reacted to the department's proposal to eliminate sec-
tion 107101 swiftly and disfavorably. Within two months of the report's
release, the Treasury had received more than 150 letters from clergy
stating support for the preservation of section 107.102 Generally the let-
ters asserted that the elimination of section 107 ultimately would force
churches to pay higher salaries to ministers, because churches plan re-
muneration taking the parsonage exclusion into consideration and ad-
just compensation and benefits accordingly.1 03 The nation's clergy
lobbied not only the Treasury; some religious leaders appealed to Presi-
95. Casino has opined that courts apply a double standard, stating that "[u]sually without
examining the nature of services provided for the benefit received, the courts conclude that [in
mail-order ministry cases] there is private inurement, while such is not found in the payment of
benefits to ministers of traditional denominations." Casino, supra note 85, at 157. In addition,
Casino asserts that if the same private inurement test that is applied to mail-order ministries was
applied to all churches, "undoubtedly the tax status of many monestaries [sic], convents and reli-
gious orders would be jeopardized." Id.
96. See infra notes 212-32 and accompanying text.
97. President Reagan officially proposed the overhaul for the first time in his 1984 State of
the Union Address. See STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE, H.R. Doc. No. 162, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5
(1984).
98. Id. at 5.
99. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1984).
100. Id. vol. 1 at 73, vol. 2 at 49-50.
101. Interestingly, the report advocated more controversial changes. See, e.g., id. vol. 2 at 62-
68 (proposing to eliminate the deduction for state and local taxes).
102. See Focus on Treasury: Incoming Treasury Letters, 26 TAx NOTES 13 (Jan. 7, 1985) (20
letters received); id. at 123 (Jan. 14, 1985) (11 letters received); id. at 313 (Jan. 28, 1985) (83 letters
received); id. at 407 (Feb. 4, 1985) (57 letters received).
103. See, e.g., id. at 123 (Jan. 14, 1985) (discussing letter of William Rusch,'which argued
"that increasing the tax burden of the clergy would force churches to redirect some of their re-
sources from charitable projects to salaries for the clergy").
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dent Reagan himself to spare the parsonage exclusion.104 Ultimately,
this lobbying achieved its desired effect; the President's final tax reform
proposal did not contain the controversial elimination of section 107,105
and the Treasury conceded defeat on the issue.108 Although Congress
did not enact the Treasury Department's suggestion, the Department's
efforts were significant because they represented the first official gov-
ernmental attempt to eliminate the parsonage allowance exclusion. This
change in governmental attitude foreshadowed other governmental and
judicial attempts to restrict section 107.
C. Dalan and the Renewed Enforcement of Section 265
Section 265 of the Internal Revenue Code states that when any
part of a taxpayer's income is not subject to tax, the IRS will disallow a
corresponding percentage of deductions otherwise available to the tax-
payer. 0 7 Seemingly, this statute would apply to ministers who receive a
tax-free housing allowance. If ,a minister were to receive a housing al-
lowance equivalent to two-thirds of her total salary, then two-thirds of
her deductions would be disallowed.108 In practice, however, the IRS
has not been entirely logical in applying this rule to ministers. Particu-
larly, the IRS has demonstrated inconsistency in interpreting two class-
es of deductions: interest and taxes that a minister incurs with respect
to purchasing a home, and business and professional expenses incurred
by a minister who receives a housing allowance.
Sections 163 and 164 of the Internal Revenue Code permit a tax-
payer to deduct home mortgage interest and real estate taxes, if the
taxpayer itemizes deductions.'09 In 1962 the IRS issued a revenue ruling
stating that a minister could itemize and deduct the interest and taxes
incurred in buying and maintaining a home, even if these same items
already were excluded from income under section 107 as part of a rental
allowance." 0 In effect, the IRS approved a double deduction for minis-
104. See, e.g., id. at 225-26 (Jan. 21, 1985) (noting letter from Jewish leader); id. at 1079-80
(Mar. 18, 1985) (noting letter from Church of Christ representative).
105. See THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIM-
PLIcrrY (1985).
106. See Focus on Treasury: Tax Reform Proposal, 28 TAx NOTS 623 (Aug. 5, 1985).
107. I.R.C. § 265 states in pertinent part that "[n]o deduction shall be allowed for ... [any
amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to one or more classes of income...
wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle." I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) (1990).
108. See Hammar, Little-Known Tax Legalities, 10 LEADERSHIP 70, 70 (providing a numeric
example).
109. The Internal Revenue Code, as amended in 1986, permits the deduction of qualified
residence interest, a term that the Code defines in detail in I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (1990). The Code
also allows the deduction of property taxes, with certain exceptions. See I.R.C. §§ 164(a)(1), (c),
(d) (1990).
110. See Rev. Rul. 62-212, 1962-2 C.B. 41.
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ters who own their homes.11
Twenty years later, the IRS attempted to reverse this position. In
Revenue Ruling 83-3112 the agency eliminated the double tax benefit,
holding that ministers no longer could deduct interest and taxes to the
extent that these amounts were excluded from gross income under the
housing allowance. The IRS based this ruling on a revised interpreta-
tion of section 265; the new position seemed to track the statutory
wording more accurately." 3 Congress, responding to afi appeal from
clergy, killed the ruling before it became official. To do this, Congress
added a provision to the 1986 Internal Revenue Code that prohibited
the IRS from denying any deduction for mortgage interest or property
taxes because a portion of a minister's salary was tax exempt."" The
amendment represents the current congressional position on the mat-
ter. The IRS has not questioned or attempted to limit the new statute.
Ministers who receive a cash housing allowance have fared more
poorly in their fight to preserve complete deduction of business and
professional expenses. In 1965 the Tax Court in Deason v. Commis-
sioner' 5 disregarded the 1962 revenue ruling and upheld the original
application of section 265 when it disallowed a pastor's deduction of the
full amount of his unreimbursed automobile expenses."16 Consistent
with its 1962 ruling, however, the IRS ignored the Deason decision. In-
stead, the agency issued tax enforcement manuals that explicitly in-
structed personnel not to enforce the Deason court's interpretation of
section 265, but to allow deduction of the full amount of allowable busi-
ness and professional expenses regardless of any tax-exempt income."'
This enforcement decision prevailed for twenty-four years until the is-
sue rose again in the case of Dalan v. Commissioner."8 In Dalan the
Tax Court followed the Deason court's proportional disallowance of de-
111. This is the terminology used by church lawyer Richard Hammar. See R. HAMMAR, supra
note 17, at 105. In allowing the double deduction the IRS apparently disregarded the effect of §
265, and assumed that § 107 controlled. See Rev. Rul. 62-212, 1962-2 C.B. 41.
112. Rev. Rul. 83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72.
113. Id.; cf. I.R.C. § 265 (1990). After originally preparing to enforce the new rule beginning
in 1983, then postponing implementation three separate times, the IRS set a final effective date for
the ruling of Jan. 1, 1987. See Rev. Rul. 85-96, 1985-2 C.B. 87.
114. I.R.C. § 265(a)(6)(B) provides in pertinent part that "[n]o deduction shall be denied
under this section for interest on a mortgage on, or real property taxes on, the home of the tax-
payer by reason of the receipt of an amount as . . . a parsonage allowance excludable from gross
income under section 107."
115. 41 T.C. 465 (1964).
116. Id.
117. See Hammar, supra note 108, at 70; Tax Planning for the Clergy, supra note 3,
11,018.1(6).
118. 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 370 (1988).
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ductions.119 Faced with two clear decisions against its longstanding pol-
icy, the IRS stopped instructing its agents not to enforce the Tax Court
interpretation of section 265,120 suggesting that the IRS will enforce the
Dalan position.121
Dalan's impact upon ministers who receive a housing allowance
seems clear: only part of their allowable business and professional ex-
penses will be deductible, depending on the percentages of their in-
comes that are represented by a tax-free housing allowance. The effect
upon a minister who is provided a parsonage by a church is not as clear,
but similar restrictions are likely. Ministers in either situation, however,
may be able to minimize the adverse impact of Dalan through expense
reimbursement schemes set up with their respective churches.122
The increased attention focused on these interests and tax deduc-
tions, as well as deductions for business and professional expenses,
should send a signal to clergy. Courts appear ready to interpret Code
sections that expressly favor ministers strictly and, depending on the
facts and the reach of their power, to bring clergy into parity with other
taxpayers. In addition, the IRS apparently will enforce such decisions.
Congress, on the other hand, may legislate to maintain a preferred tax
status.1
23
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT SECTION 107
A. The Establishment Clause
All reasonable exemptions from taxation are a result of legislative
grace.124 Section 107 is no exception to this rule; a minister has no con-
stitutional right to the exemption it provides.2 5 The Constitution, in
fact, provides a formidable barrier to favorable tax treatment for minis-
ters, or any other religious parties, in the establishment clause of the
first amendment.
The establishment clause forbids any law respecting an establish-
ment of religion. 128 This language prohibits more than the establish-
ment of a state church or state religion; it also forbids what the
Supreme Court has labeled as "three main evils": sponsorship, financial
119. Id. at 371.
120. See Tax Planning for the Clergy, supra note 3, % 11,018.1(6).
121. See id.; see also Hammar, supra note 108, at 70.
122. Suggestions appear in Hammar, supra note 108, at 70, and in Tax Planning for the
Clergy, supra note 3, 1 11,018.1(6).
123. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 114.
124. See Parker v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 792, 795 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1026 (1967).
125. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1262.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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support, and active involvement of the government in religious activ-
ity.117 When balanced with the first amendment's accompanying clause
preventing the government from impairing the free exercise of reli-
gion,128 the establishment clause commands an attitude of governmen-
tal neutrality toward religion.'29
Part V of this Note first analyzes section 107 to determine whether
the statute is consistent with this command. This analysis traces devel-
opment of the two key tests used by the Supreme Court since 1970 for
determining constitutionality under the establishment clause. Part V
then evaluates whether section 107 meets the criteria of either test, and
concludes that a properly framed establishment clause challenge to the
statute quite likely would succeed.
1. The Lemon Test 1 0
The Supreme Court began to develop a test for determining
whether tax statutes violated the establishment clause in the early
1970s. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York' a property owner
sought an injunction to prevent the granting of property tax exemp-
tions to religious organizations using property solely for religious wor-
ship.13 2 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren
Burger, upheld the exemption, concluding that (1) the tax exemption
did not establish, sponsor, or support religion, 33 and that (2) the stat-
ute did not effect "excessive government entanglement" with religion.
34
The following term, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,3 5 Chief Justice Burger
refined the Walz language and developed the tripartite test that guided
the Court's next decade of establishment clause jurisprudence. At issue
in Lemon were statutes that ordered state aid for nonpublic
schools-including those affiliated with religious institutions-to fund
the teaching of secular subjects either directly or through reimburse-
ment. 38 To be constitutional, the Court held, each statute (1) must
have a secular legislative purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary
127. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)).
128. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
129. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
130. For additional discussion of pre-1982 application of the Lemon test (named after Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 602, the case in which the Supreme Court first used it), see Comment,
supra note 21, at 1264-72 and Note, supra note 48, at 853-59.
131. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
132. Id. at 666.
133. Id. at 674.
134. Id.
135. 403 U.S. at 602.
136. Id. at 607-10.
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effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) cannot foster
an excessive entanglement of the government in religion.1'7 While the
Court did not find that the statutes had improper purposes or unac-
ceptable primary effects, because the challenged laws would require
state surveillance and inspection so great as to constitute excessive en-
tanglement, 38 the Court found that the statutes failed the third prong
of the test and struck them as unconstitutional.
Until the early 1980s the Court applied the Lemon test to analyze
alleged violations of the establishment clause."3 9 During the next four-
teen years, the Court struck down statutes providing public funds to
repair private schools, 14 0 a law requiring the Ten Commandments to be
posted in classrooms,"' and a statute granting churches the power to
prevent issuance of liquor licenses to businesses within five hundred
feet of a church." 2
Under the Lemon analysis, section 107 probably would be found to
violate the establishment clause. The statute does not articulate a secu-
lar purpose, nor does the sparse legislative history express or imply one.
Because the statute on its face appears to confer a benefit on the basis
of religion, the Court would be forced to imply a legitimate purpose to
constitutionalize the exemption. Commentators have suggested two
possible secular purposes for section 107. First, Congress may have in-
tended, consistent with the logic in Walz, to prevent government entan-
glement with churches and ministers that would result from a tax on
parsonages or rental allowances. That government entanglement actu-
ally may be greater because of the exemption weakens this hypothe-
sis. 143 Alternatively, Congress could have intended to confer a tax
benefit to an economically deprived group.' 44 Wages for clergy in 1954
were approximately nine percent below the national labor force aver-
age.145 Such an implied purpose is unlikely, however, given the many
other equally under-compensated groups. Congress may condition re-
137. Id. at 612-13.
138. Id. at 621-22.
139. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684-89 (1971). As Justice Lewis Powell stated,
"[T]he Lemon test has been applied consistently in Establishment Clause cases since it was
adopted in 1971. In a word, it has been the law." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 n.3 (1985)
(Powell, J., concurring).
140. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
141. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
142. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
143. See Note, supra note 48, at 862-63.
144. At least one commentator has suggested, and rejected, this possibility. See Comment,
supra note 21, at 1268.
145. See id. (discussing the income data presented in the legislative history of the 1954
amendment).
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ceipt of a tax benefit on the recipient's occupation, but when this occu-
pation must be religious for the benefit to attach, Congress hardly can
describe its purpose as secular. 1"
Section 107 probably would fail the second prong of Lemon, as
well. While a statute that incidentally benefits religion, such as a stat-
ute granting benefits to a wide class including churches,141 does not vio-
late the establishment clause, 148 a benefit conferred directly on a
minister is more problematic. The granting of a tax exemption to a
minister is in effect a government subsidy and, consequently, results in
a higher after-tax salary for the minister. In addition, the exemption
indirectly benefits the minister's church by enabling it to pay the minis-
ter a lower salary. Section 107 will pass muster only if the benefitting
class is broad enough to make this economic benefit to the church inci-
dental. Because the statute seems to confer a primary benefit that may
advance religion, it also fails Lemon's second prong.
Finally, section 107 appears to fail Lemon's requirement that it not
cause an excessive entanglement of government and religion. Treasury
regulations detail the requirements that a minister must meet to qualify
for the parsonage exclusion; the IRS and the courts have devoted an
ever increasing amount of time and litigation to determining whether
various taxpayers meet these criteria. 149 In addition, the IRS often must
determine whether a minister's housing allowance is reasonable-an ex-
tremely fact-sensitive, and therefore, painstaking process-and whether
it was paid legitimately and not as a sham to cover private inurement of
charitable contributions. Preservation of the statute, even if it were to
pass Lemon's first two prongs, would require constant government anal-
ysis and regular litigation-entanglement that is arguably excessive.
Elimination of the statute, on the other hand, would decrease the level
of government involvement in religious affairs.
2. A Period of Transition
In the early 1980s, some members of the Supreme Court began ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with the Lemon test. The Court's opinion in
Larson v. Valente'5" first revealed this dissatisfaction. In Larson mem-
146. See id.
147. See Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
148. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771.
149. A LEXIS search conducted by the Author on Mar. 6, 1989 revealed that approximately
54 federal cases have interpreted and applied § 107's phrase "minister of the gospel" since the
1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Code, and that 36 of these have been decided since 1980. A
symptom of the IRS's greater time commitment is found in its 1989 announcement that it no
longer will issue advance rulings for certain interpretations of § 107. Rev. Proc. 89-54, 1989-2 C.B.
633.
150. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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bers of the Unification Church challenged a Minnesota statute that re-
quired religious organizations to meet certain registration and reporting
requirements if they received half or less of their total contributions
from members or affiliated organizations. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice William Brennan, held that the Lemon test was unnecessary to
decide the establishment issue presented by the case.151 Lemon, accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, was useful only when analyzing laws that confer
a benefit to all religions, not laws that discriminate among religions. 152
In Marsh v. Chambers'5" the Court upheld a Nebraska law that
provided for a publicly paid chaplain to open each legislative session
with prayer.' The Court did not apply Lemon in its analysis. Instead,
Chief Justice Burger wrote that the unique and longstanding position of
legislative prayers in United States history had made them a part of the
fabric of American society, and thus, the prayers had validity beyond
their religious significance. 55 While noting that "historical patterns
[alone] cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-
tees,"' 5 the Court concluded that legislative prayer by state-paid chap-
lains presented no serious establishment threat. 57 Justice Brennan
dissented, finding that the law constituted a clear violation of the estab-
lishment clause. 158
Marsh foreshadowed a major change in establishment clause juris-
prudence. It failed, however, to indicate either the source or the content
of the test that soon would replace the Lemon approach. The source
would be Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, and the content would be the
theory of endorsement.
3. The Endorsement Test
In Lynch v. Donnelly59 the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of a city's inclusion of a nativity scene as part of a Christmas
display. The display, which the city had erected annually for some forty
years, was accompanied by secular Christmas symbols, such as Santa
Claus. A five to four majority found that the scene did not violate the
151. Id. at 252.
152. Id.
153. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
154. Id. at 786.
155. Id. at 792.
156. Id. at 790.
157. Id. at 795.
158. Id. at 800-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that "any group of law
students [applying] the principles of Lemon to the question... would nearly unanimously find
the practice to be unconstitutional." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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establishment clause under the Lemon test.160 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, said the test was merely a useful guide and
emphasized that the Court would not limit its establishment clause ju-
risprudence to any single test.' 6'
Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority opinion, but wrote sep-
arately to suggest a clarification of the Court's establishment clause
doctrine. 62 The purpose of the clause, Justice O'Connor stated, is to
prohibit the government from making affiliation with any religion rele-
vant to a person's standing in the political community.6 3 Government
can violate the clause in two ways: by becoming excessively entangled
with religious institutions or by endorsing or disapproving any reli-
gion. 164 Justice O'Connor proposed that the Court, in lieu of mechani-
cally applying Lemon's purpose and effect prongs, should inquire
whether the governmental activity seems to endorse or deprecate reli-
gion. 65 Under this interpretation of the establishment clause, Justice
O'Connor suggested, a government practice that even directly advances
or inhibits the practice of religion is valid unless the public would per-
ceive the practice as an endorsement or disapproval of religion.'
Although Justice O'Connor labeled her Lynch concurrence a clarifi-
cation of the Lemon test, she gave her endorsement theory stronger in-
dependent status the following term in Wallace v. Jaffree.161  The
number of written opinions in Wallace reflects the extent of the Court's
disagreement over establishment clause standards. 6 ' In an opinion by
Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court applied the first prong of the
Lemon test to strike down an Alabama statute that authorized a one
minute period of silence in all public schools for voluntary prayer or
meditation.6 9 Chief Justice Burger strongly dissented, rejecting the ma-
jority's rigid adherence to the Lemon test.170 In a lengthy dissent Jus-
160. Id. at 681.
161. Id. at 679.
162. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 690-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
168. The Justices also disagreed on how to determine a statute's purpose. Compare Wallace,
472 U.S. at 56-60 (Stevens, J.) (stating that the expressed purpose of the legislature cannot be
accepted without investigation into its unexpressed motives) with id. at 86-88 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (countering that the purpose expressed by the legislature always should be given great
weight and is conclusive in some cases).
169. Id. at 41-42, 56.
170. Chief Justice Burger called the majority's adherence to the Lemon test "a naive preoc-
cupation with an easy, bright-line approach." Id. at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Byron
White wrote a separate dissent agreeing for the most part with Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 90
(White, J., dissenting).
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tice William Rehnquist proposed a complete abdication of the Lemon
test.1
71
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment of the Court and
fleshed out the endorsement test she had proposed in Lynch.17 2 She re-
flected that although the Lemon test held promise initially, it had be-
come problematic.17 3 While Justice O'Connor did not advocate complete
abandonment of the Lemon criteria, she did state that an establishment
test must provide more than "a constitutional 'signpost'" to be used
only as the predilections of the Court dictated.1 74
Justice O'Connor recognized the need for a constitutional frame-
work that could provide consistency in establishment cases.1 75 Such 'a
principle, in Justice O'Connor's thinking, would enable the Court to
distinguish between statutes and practices that incidentally help or hin-
der religious belief and laws that convey or attempt to convey, a mes-
sage that religion is preferred. 78 The test for making this determination
would involve two steps. First, if the legislature expresses a plausible
secular purpose for the statute, courts generally should defer to that
stated purpose. If, however, the statute's primary purpose is to endorse
religion-as indicated by the express language of the statute, its legisla-
tive history, or administrative interpretation-the courts should invali-
date it as improper.1 77 Second, courts must determine objectively
whether the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute
show it to be an endorsement of religion. 178 If so, the statute also would
be invalid.
Following its expansion in Wallace, Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test began gaining the support of other Justices. Though a major-
ity of the Court used Lemon to strike down a law requiring employers
to respect employee Sabbath days in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc.,'1 79 Justice Thurgood Marshall joined Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion, in which she enunciated and applied her endorsement test. 8 0
In School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball81 a majority of the Court
expressly reaffirmed the Lemon test,1 82 but seemed receptive to Justice
171. Id. at 110-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 67-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 68-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
175. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. supra note 168 (discussing disagreement
among the Justices on how to determine a statute's purpose).
178. 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
179. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
180. Id. at 711-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
182. Id. at 383.
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O'Connor's endorsement concept.183 In Corporation of Presiding
Bishop v. Amos"" a majority of the Court again applied Lemon-this
time to uphold an application of Title VII's prohibition against reli-
gious discrimination in employment-but Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun conveyed a growing appreciation for the endorsement
test,"' which Justice O'Connor reiterated in her concurring opinion. 86
A unified majority applied the endorsement test for the first time
in County of Allegheny v. ACL U.1817 Allegheny arose from facts remi-
niscent of those in Lynch. The plaintiffs sued the city of Pittsburgh for
displaying a nativity scene at the county courthouse and displaying a
Jewish menorah next to the city-county office building.'88 A local Ro-
man Catholic group donated and placed the nativity scene; a local Jew-
ish group owned the menorah, but the city erected the displays.'89
Although they disagreed on the status of the menorah, 190 a majority of
the Justices employed the endorsement test to determine the constitu-
tionality of the nativity display.
Justice Harry Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens, and O'Connor, noted that although the Court had applied
Lemon's tripartite analysis regularly in past cases,' 91 in recent cases the
Court had begun focusing on whether the challenged government prac-
tice had the effect or purpose of endorsing religion.192 Justice Blackmun
then applied the endorsement test, relying heavily on Justice
O'Connor's opinions in Lynch and Wallace.' The majority concluded
that the county had crossed the line drawn in Lynch-that the govern-
ment may acknowledge Christmas, but not in a way that endorses the
Christian religion. 94 According to Justice Blackmun, Lynch and the
rest of the Court's establishment jurisprudence demonstrated that the
nativity display violated the establishment clause because it amounted
183. Id. at 389-90, 392 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
184. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
185. Id. at 345 n.5 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring), 346 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
186. Id. at 346-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
187. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (plurality decision).
188. Id. at 3093, 3097-98 (plurality opinion).
189. Id. at 3093 (plurality opinion).
190. Two of the five Justices that invalidated the creche display-Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor-joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy to uphold the
constitutionality of the menorah display, although they disagreed on the rationale. See id. at 3113-
15 (plurality opinion); id. at 3122 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 3100.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 3101, 3103-05.
194. Id. at 3105.
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to a governmental endorsement of Christianity."9 5
Justice Anthony Kennedy bitterly dissented, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Byron White and Antonin Scalia. 196 While
agreeing with the majority that the Lemon test was an inadequate
guide to deciding establishment cases, Justice Kennedy criticized the
majority's adoption of the endorsement test.197 Justice Kennedy con-
cluded that protecting individuals from "mere feelings of exclusion"' 98
would result in the invalidation of scores of previously accepted ac-
knowledgments of religion because any nonreligious observers would re-
ceive the clear message that their beliefs failed to conform with the
political norm.199 Alternatively, if the Court preserved longstanding
practices that sent such a message, the endorsement test necessarily
would be distorted until it was unworkable.200
Majority adoption of the endorsement test in Allegheny marked a
significant shift in the Supreme Court's establishment clause jurispru-
dence, and section 107 must pass its scrutiny to be constitutional. Al-
though the result appears less certain than under Lemon, section 107
probably would fail the endorsement test. The two-step approach out-
lined by Justice O'Connor presents an obvious concern: the available
legislative history expresses an arguably religious purpose for section
107,101 and an objective observer almost undoubtedly would find that
the statute endorses religion in practice. It is possible, however, that the
refining process accompanying future application of the test will offer
opportunity for several possible arguments in favor of the statute,
based on elements mentioned in the various Supreme Court decisions
from the past decade.
First, long-term acceptance of the parsonage allowance exclusion as
a part of the national tax policy may bring it within the Marsh v.
Chambers guidelines. 0 2 The unbroken practice of granting the exclu-
sion to ministers since 1921 arguably has stemmed from traditional fa-
voritism to the clergy and constitutes a tolerable acknowledgment of
beliefs that poses no threat of establishment .2 0 3 Two primary factors
upon which Marsh rested-timing and effect-undermine this argu-
195. Id.
196. Id. at 3134-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197. Id. at 3134-35, 3141. Justice Kennedy found the endorsement test "flawed in its funda-
mentals and unworkable in practice." Id. at 3141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
198. Id. at 3143 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. Id. at 3143-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. Id. at 3144 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
202. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
203. See id. at 791.
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ment. While legislative prayers began with the first Congress and were
found to have no proselytizing effect,2 04 the parsonage allowance exclu-
sion is a creation of fairly recent origin that clearly seems to benefit
persons who proselytize for a living. These differences could be fatal to
section 107.
Unlike the nativity scene in Lynch v. Donnelly,20 5 however, section
107 arguably does not have the ultimate effect of endorsing religion,
even though advancement of religion is a primary effect.208 One could
assert that the endorsement test permits tax breaks based on religious
vocation because the test does not preclude government from taking
religion into account when it makes law and policy.2 0 Although more
persuasive than an argument based on Marsh, this approach probably
would fail as well. While the endorsement test does not preclude a con-
sideration of religion in the formation of government policy, it does pre-
clude government from conveying a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.0 8
Section 107 on its face favors taxpayers with a religious vocation,
thereby creating a strong presumption that its purpose is to endorse
religious efforts. 09 Additionally, because the IRS and courts grant sec-
tion 107 treatment only to bona fide ministers, similarly situated practi-
tioners in other religions would not qualify for the exclusion. 10 This
result conveys a message that religious workers are favored over secular
workers and, therefore, would fail the endorsement test. In short, sec-
tion 107 appears ripe for invalidation on establishment clause grounds,
whether subjected to the Lemon tripartite test or to the endorsement
analysis used in Allegheny. 1' Ironically, two recent Supreme Court
204. Id. at 792.
205. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
206. See id. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
209. See generally id. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 905-06 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that such differentiation may violate the establishment clause).
211. Of course, any challenging party would need standing, and it is unclear what type of
injury would satisfy the "concrete factual" standard of Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Logically, a religious
practitioner who is denied the exclusion for failing to meet the narrow criteria of a "minister of the
gospel," discussed supra subpart III(A), suffers an injury by paying tax that qualifying ministers
do not.
In Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 895-96, however, the State of Texas disputed an analogous
argument. The plaintiff in Texas Monthly was a nonreligious periodical that the State had denied
a sales tax exemption granted to religious periodicals. In disputing the plaintiff's standing, the
State argued that even if the Supreme Court invalidated the exemption, the plaintiff would receive
no refund because the State simply would remove the exclusion for religious publications. There-
fore, the plaintiff had suffered no injury. Id. at 896.
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cases involving the constitutionality of tax exemptions for religious en-
tities indicate that an establishment clause challenge to section 107
might be unnecessary.
B. Texas Monthly and Jimmy Swaggart Ministries: Death Knell for
the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion?
After a decade of establishment clause jurisprudence that resulted
in a new and arguably less restrictive approach to determining viola-
tions of the clause, one might expect the Court to look more favorably
on tax exemptions granted to religious organizations. Surprisingly, this
is not this case. This Note next examines two very recent decisions by
the Court that display a critical approach toward these exemptions and
do not bode well for the survival of section 107.
In 1989 the Supreme Court struck down a statute that granted a
state sales tax exemption to religious periodicals in Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock. 12 A plurality composed of Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens relied primarily on Walz v. Tax Commission of New
York21s to hold that the statute was too narrow to pass establishment
clause scrutiny.214 Unlike the property tax exemptions at issue in Walz,
which benefited not only churches but numerous other philanthropic
and non-profit groups, the Texas exemption was aimed to benefit peri-
odicals published or distributed by religious faiths and consisting
wholly of doctrinal writings.15 Because the statute lacked a secular ob-
jective that would justify granting the exemption to nonreligious publi-
Justice Brennan, writing for three Justices, rejected this argument, stating that its adoption
"'would effectively insulate underinclusive statutes from constitutional challenge.'" Id. (quoting
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227 (1987)). In addition, Justice Brennan
stated:
It is not for us to decide whether the correct response as a matter of state law to a finding
that a state tax exemption is unconstitutional is to eliminate it, to curtail it, to broaden it, or
to invalidate the tax altogether. . . .A live controversy persists over Texas Monthly's right to
recover the [tax] it paid, plus interest. Texas cannot strip appellant of standing by changing
the law after taking its money.
Id. Although Justice Brennan wrote only for a plurality, apparently all the Justices assumed that
the plaintiff had standing because three Justices concurred in the judgment in favor of Texas
Monthly and the dissent focused on the case's merits. Id. at 905 (Justices White, Blackmun, and
O'Connor, concurring in the judgment), 907 (Justices Scalia and Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, dissenting).
Even if a plaintiff has standing under Texas Monthly, a major stumbling block remains. The
amount of any recovery for a successful challenge to § 107 undoubtedly would be far less than the
costs of litigation. A plaintiff with limited means or no public interest counsel to absorb the costs
of suit, therefore, probably would not initiate a challenge. This fact alone may preserve the parson-
age allowance exclusion indefinitely.
212. 109 S. Ct. at 890.
213. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
214. Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 899.
215. Id.
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cations,21 6 it unconstitutionally subsidized religious organizations and
could not be viewed as anything but state sponsorship of religious be-
lief.217 In a concurring opinion Justices Blackmun and O'Connor held
that a state may not give a tax benefit to proponents of religion without
also giving it to others who actively might advocate disbelief in
218religion.
The plurality and concurring opinions in Texas Monthly raise seri-
ous doubts about the constitutionality of section 107. Specifically, sec-
tion 107 grants a tax break to those who advocate religion for a living,
but denies the savings to taxpayers who do not meet the IRS qualifica-
tions for a minister of the gospel. Section 107 is drawn and interpreted
narrowly and does not embrace a broad class of beneficiaries that might
legitimize it under a Walz analysis. As such, section 107 arguably repre-
sents a subsidy directed exclusively to religious beneficiaries, which
does not remove any state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of reli-
gion 219 and may provide unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious
interests.220 Justice Scalia, in his Texas Monthly dissent, sensed the
possible impact of the decision; he implied that section 107, along with
some forty-five particular state statutes, would fall as a casualty of the
majority's "judicial demolition project."'221
In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of Califor-
nia 22 the Court firmly established that regardless of whether narrowly
drawn tax exemptions for religious organizations are valid, they are not
mandated constitutionally. In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries an evangelis-
tic association contended that state taxes levied on the sales of religious
materials violated the free exercise and establishment clauses of the
first amendment.22 3 The association relied on two older Supreme Court
decisions, Murdock v. Pennsylvania 2 4 and Follett v. McCormick,225 for
216. Id. at 901.
217. Id. at 899-900.
218. Id. at 905-06 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring).
219. See id. at 899.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 908-09 & n.3, 907 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990).
223. Id. at 693.
224. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). In Murdock Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted for violating a city
ordinance that required all persons canvassing or soliciting within the city to pay a fee and procure
a license. The Court reversed the convictions, stating that "[t]his form of religious activity occu-
pies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching
in the pulpits," and held that the city could not require a license or fee for the activity. Id. at 109.
225. 321 U.S. 573 (1944). The Court in Follett held that a city could not force "one who
earns his livelihood as an evangelist or preacher in his home town" to pay a flat fee and obtain a
license to sell books, even though the ordinance required all booksellers to procure the license. Id.
at 576-77.
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its argument that a state may not impose a sales tax on the distribution
of religious material by a religious organization.22
The Court unanimously rejected the association's reading of Mur-
dock and Follett, stating that those cases concerned imposition of flat
license taxes227 that operated as impermissible prior restraints on the
exercise of religious liberty.2 28 By contrast, the tax at issue in Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries was not flat, applying neutrally to all retail sales
and representing only a small fraction of any given sale. Imposed in this
manner, the sales tax did not infringe the right to disseminate religious
information, ideas, or beliefs, per se. Rather, it taxed only the privilege
of making retail sales; this taxation presented no constitutionally signif-
icant burden to the ministry.229
The Court additionally held that the tax presented no establish-
ment clause problem because a generally applicable tax has an undenia-
bly secular purpose, neither advances nor inhibits religion, and is by its
essence neutral and nondiscriminatory on questions of religious be-
lief. 230 Thus, the Court held, the sales tax in Jimmy Swaggart Minis-
tries did not call into question the core values of the establishment
clause.231 Even assuming that collecting, recording, and paying the tax
caused a government entanglement with religion, as the ministry con-
tended, the Court held that any entanglement failed to rise to a consti-
tutionally significant level.23 2
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries threatens section 107 in two important
respects. First, the decision clearly establishes that the first amendment
in no way mandates tax exemptions for religious organizations. Second,
by holding that a generally applicable tax imposed on religious organi-
zations does not call into question the core values of the free exercise
and establishment clauses, the Court may have eliminated any constitu-
tional defense to the eradication of section 107. The federal income tax,
like the California state sales tax upheld in Jimmy Swaggart Minis-
tries, is generally applicable and presents no unique burden to minis-
ters. This fact probably removes any legitimate basis for maintenance
226. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 110 S. Ct. at 693.
227. A "flat" tax, in the words of the Court, "is fixed in amount and unrelated to the scope of
... activities ... or to their realized revenues." Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113. License taxes are a
common example. See id.
228. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 110 S. Ct. at 694.
229. Id. at 695-96. The Supreme Court recently used the same rationale in ruling that a
generally applicable, religion-neutral criminal law that prohibited the religious use of peyote by
Native Americans did not violate the free exercise clause. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. 1595 (1990).
230. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 110 S. Ct. at 698.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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of the parsonage allowance exclusion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Currently, section 107 offers significant tax savings to a minister
who satisfies IRS criteria. The exclusion's vitality, however, appears
threatened. The IRS's recently enhanced scrutiny of section 107 deduc-
tions-requiring churches to meet strict private inurement criteria233
and ministers to document their credentials and expenses within nar-
row parameters-may foreshadow future attacks on deductions that
have an exclusively religious basis. Although the parsonage allowance
exclusion will continue to benefit prudent institutions and clergy, the
continuation of this benefit is uncertain.
The crackdown on mail-order ministries, the treasury's attempts to
eliminate section 107, and the judicial attitude evidenced in Dalan may
suggest a coming increase in restrictions on the exclusion. The IRS
could impose certain restrictions, such as requiring evidence of a rea-
sonable relationship between services rendered by the minister and the
amount of cash allowance provided, without implicating constitutional
concerns. 3 4 More critically, recent establishment clause decisions indi-
cate that the Supreme Court could invalidate the exclusion if it is chal-
lenged properly. The Supreme Court, with its adoption of the
endorsement test and its decisions in Texas Monthly and Jimmy Swag-
gart Ministries, appears ready to scrutinize tax breaks for ministers as
strictly as those for any other benefitted class. In short, change seems
inevitable. The parsonage allowance exclusion may not die, but it cer-
tainly faces a restricted future.
Matthew W. Foster
233. See supra note 61.
234. Bruce Casino, in the mail-order ministry context, has made this exact proposal. See
Casino, supra note 85, at 157.
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